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Abstract:
In a wide sense, the paper deals with the shifting regulatory character of labour law (more par-
ticularly, labour-related regulation in a wider context). The paper strives to highlight how the 
effectiveness of labour law is increasingly related to the activation of market-based incentives for 
compliance and what kind of innovative regulatory mechanisms might support such aspirations. 
More concretely, a particular, EU-linked innovative ‘regulatory case study’ is conceptualized in 
a complex theoretical framework: the link between labour law and non-financial (‘social’) re-
porting. In this context, the paper analyses Directive 2014/95/EU on disclosure of non-financial 
and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups amending the Accounting 
Directive 2013/34/EU both from the perspective of regulatory theories and labour law doctrine. 
The theoretical pillars of our analysis are rooted, among others, in the new governance, decentred 
regulation, reflexive law, regulated self-regulation and light-touch regulation literature. The pa-
per also draws insights from the ‘law and economics’ study of labour law and attempts to relate 
all these regulatory theories to non-financial reporting in the context of labour law. 
The main goal of the contribution is to identify how these relatively new legal ‘channels’ might be 
able to bring new forces of compliance into labour law, and how the role of law is changing. The 
essence of associated EU-level (and national-level) legal developments is analysed in a theoreti-
cal context, with a broad view on the possible future of labour regulation. Even though these reg-
ulatory methods are still rather on the periphery of labour law (in strong intersections with other 
branches of law, such as company law), they have the potential to become more integral building 
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blocks of a modern labour law architecture. These new regulatory methods can contribute to 
improved compliance with labour laws and can foster responsible, decent employment practices. 
Keywords: EU law, labour law, Accounting Directive, law and economics
i.  iNtroDUCtioN 
in a broad sense, the paper intends to deal with the changing character of labour law 
(more particularly, labour-related regulation in a wider meaning). to underline our broad 
theoretical arguments about the shifting character of labour law, one - especially euro-
pean and eU-linked - novel ‘regulatory case study’ is conceptualized in a comprehensive 
theoretical framework.
The underlying, exemplary regulatory ‘case study’ is the relationship between labour 
law and non-financial (social) reporting. in our context, non-financial1 corporate disclo-
sure and reporting refers to the practice of giving public information about environmen-
tal, social and governance performance. This corporate activity is mostly voluntary, as 
part of the Csr (Corporate social responsibility)-strategy2, but, to some extent, in some 
jurisdictions (e.g. France, UK, Denmark) it is also obligatory. The disclosure may take 
many forms, such as sustainability / Csr / esg3 / ‘triple bottom line’ / social reports. in-
formation about working conditions and employment practices are usually vital elements 
of the ‘social’ part of the report. The main idea of social reporting is to structurally inform 
the market and the public about working and employment conditions with a view to boost 
comparison and a positive, image-based competition among companies.  The fundamen-
tal idea of non-financial reporting can also be described by a well-known quote4: “sunlight 
is the best disinfectant.” This refers to the benefits of openness and transparency5, what is 
also very crucial in terms of labour law. 
1   Non-financial indicators are measures that are not directly linked to financial performance but still impact a 
company or organisation’s overall performance – and in many cases even the financial performance.
2   according to the most recent definition of the european Commission, Csr is “the responsibility of enter-
prises for their impacts on society” (eU Commission, 2011).
3   environmental, social and governance reporting (esg). The term describes environmental, social and gov-
ernance issues that investors are considering in the context of corporate behaviour. in order to maximize 
the sustainable value of a business, the company should be able to understand and consider the environ-
mental, social and governance (esg) factors that determine its extra financial performance. They must 
also be able to measure them and to provide evidence on how they impact on financial drivers, so that these 
factors can be recognized and evaluated by the market.
4   From U.s. supreme Court Justice louis brandeis. 
5   transparency: the disclosure of all material information and the capability to measure its results in a quan-
titative way through key indicators.
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The public transparency of labour practices and the increased accountability for them 
might facilitate compliance and create a positive, upward spiral (as a so-called ‘pulling 
force’). employers might be involved in a positive, image- and market-based, self-regula-
tory competition based on the quality of their employment standards and Csr-practices 
(see the idea of the “race to the top”).6 such information strategies might also have a wide 
educational role as they can encourage the adoption of decent employment practices by 
demonstrating best practices. Furthermore, not less importantly, non-financial informa-
tion is increasingly essential for the persuasion of investors and for the engagement of 
other stakeholders (such as regulators, public authorities, the general public, consumers, 
Ngos, trade unions, business partners, local communities, potential and current em-
ployees). on a more abstract level, social reporting can help to increase public trust in 
enterprises.  
The aim of the paper is to identify how this relatively innovative legal ‘channel’ might 
be able to indirectly bring new forces of compliance into labour law, and how the role of 
law is changing. The new eU-Directive on non-financial reporting7 is analysed in a theo-
retical context, with a broad view on the possible future directions of labour regulation in 
general. even though information disclosure as regulatory strategy is still immature and 
situates rather on the side-lines of labour law (in strong intersection with other branches 
of law, such as company law), it can have the potential to become more integral building 
block of a modern labour law architecture. at the end of the day, information disclosure 
as regulatory strategy might contribute to enhanced compliance with labour laws and can 
also foster responsible, decent employment practices. 
The main purpose of the paper is to point out that such ‘fresh’, non-legal, market-based 
forces, energies of labour law compliance as public transparency are emerging, and these 
energies might be effectively triggered and catalysed by innovative, well-targeted regula-
tory mechanisms. The paper highlights that even if these regulatory ideas are grounded 
in soft law and Csr (Corporate social responsibility), they are on a so-called “hardening” 
way of progression and can be conceptualised as promising fields of legal development. 
The nature of statutory law is presumed to alter in the context of these regulatory terrains: 
the law should play a triggering, activating role in relation to corporate self-regulation, in-
stead of a “policing” approach. legal interventions should rather be well-directed, forceful 
‘semaphores’ instead of purely hard-hitting ‘truncheons’. The ultimate goal of information 
disclosure as regulatory strategy is in fact to effectuate a behavioural change on the side of 
employers, in order to uphold decent working conditions.
6   b. Hepple, Labour laws and global trade, oregon, Hart publishing, oxford and portland, 2005, p. 85.; 
murray and Jill, „Corporate social responsibility Discussion paper”, Global Social Policy vol. 4 (2), 2004, p. 
174; simon Zadek, „responsible competitiveness: reshaping global markets through responsible business 
practices.” Corporate Governance, vol. 6. no. 4, 2006, p. 334.
7   Directive 2014/95/eU on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertak-
ings and groups amending the accounting Directive 2013/34/eU. 
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The paper starts with a general, introductory description of the idea and the develop-
ment of non-financial reporting (Chapter 1). as we presume that this innovative regu-
latory technique echos some overall contemporary trends in modern regulatory theory, 
Chapter 2 points out the main theoretical streams of thoughts that - in our view - might 
back up these regulatory trends (including the idea of non-financial reporting). Chapter 3 
briefly describes Directive 2014/95/eU from a basically labour law perspective. Directive 
2014/95/eU is about disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large 
undertakings and groups amending the accounting Directive 2013/34/eU. Furthermore, 
this Chapter aims to show how the general regulatory concepts and ideas (described brief-
ly in Chapter 2) are reflected in the Directive’s approach. Chapter 4 reflects on the main 
features of this regulatory concept and its possible effects on and interplays with the gen-
erally changing character of labour regulation.
ii.  NoN-FiNaNCial reportiNg: tHe iDea aND its 
DevelopmeNt iN brieF
The paper intends to describe and put into context one illustrative example for innova-
tive regulatory ideas on the periphery of labour law.8 The paper strives to highlight some re-
lationships between labour law and this related -  but distinct - regulatory method in order 
to conceptualise innovative enforcement strategies for labour law. Non-financial reporting 
as a regulatory technique is clearly outside the conventional, ‘mainstream’ scope of labour 
law, but it can have direct impact on the behaviour of employers and as a consequence, on 
working conditions and labour standards. even if non-financial reporting, as a regulatory 
technique is not ‘labour law’ in a strict sense, it might also serve various labour law-related 
ends. This Chapter aims to describe the way of evolution of the idea of non-financial re-
porting as a regulatory technique: the cranky, but still obvious road from voluntarism, soft 
law (and self-regulation) towards hard law (with a particular focus on eU-law). 
There seems to be an emerging legal development - especially on the eU level -, in 
which non-financial reporting, as a regulatory technique is increasingly manifested on 
the regulatory agenda. This part illustrates how the soft law (and Csr)-based innovative 
regulatory idea of non-financial reporting might progressively seep into hard law.9 at first, 
8   other innovative regulatory ideas (not discussed in this paper) could be: socially responsible public pro-
curement, subcontracting liability etc. see for more details: a. Kun, A munkajogi megfelelés ösztönzésének 
újszerű jogi eszközei, budapest,  l’Harmattan Kiadó-Kre, 2014.
9   The core debate in Csr concerns the ‘voluntarism versus regulation’ track. see for more details: Kun, attila 
&Hajdú, József, ´Conceptualization of Corporate social responsibility in the context of labour law´in: 
r. blanpain and w. Kluwer, Rethinking Corporate Governnance, From Shareholder Value to Stakeholder 
Value´, 2011. pp. 175-194; a.C. Neal, ´Corporate social responsibility: governance gain or laissez-Faire 
Figleaf?´Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, vol. 29, no. 4, 2008.
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we give some hints about the private, self-regulatory, soft law roots of the regulatory idea, 
then we demonstrate the perceived process of ‘juridification’.  
Corporate non-financial / sustainability reporting has a long history going back to en-
vironmental reporting.10 social reporting is a rather recent trend. many companies volun-
tarily produce annual reports (for e.g. as part of their Csr-strategy) and there are a wide 
array of private auditing, screening, rating and reporting standards around. some organ-
isations do not have stand-alone social reports, but prefer to report their non-financial 
performance through other existing reporting mechanisms. The key drivers and patterns 
for the quality of sustainability reports are the guidelines of the global reporting initia-
tive (gri)11, various award schemes or rankings. The simple dissemination of voluntary 
codes of conducts is also an alternative – rather immature − form of disclosure. During 
the 2000s non-financial (including social) reporting has become increasingly widespread 
and kind of an expected part of business. 
social reporting is about providing useful, transparent information for companies, in-
vestors and society at large. according to experiences, companies that already publish 
information on their financial and non-financial performances typically take a longer 
term perspective in their decision-making.12 social reporting helps organizational trans-
parency, internal self-reflection (and self-regulation), improves compliance (and respon-
sibility beyond compliance) and boosts stakeholder engagement. as one metaphoric 
saying describes the essence of reporting, “people who are forced to undress in public 
will presumably pay some attention to their figures.”13 according to estlund, the benefits 
of information disclosure can be described along three dimensions: “improving the effi-
ciency of employment contracts and labour markets, improving compliance with exist-
ing substantive mandates, and inducing employers to reach ‘beyond compliance’ toward 
evolving norms of good employment practices and standards of social responsibility.”14 
as one report about reporting observes: “The obedience of private enterprises to the law 
10   The first environmental reports were published in the late 1980s by companies in the chemical industry 
which had serious image problems.
11   The gri enable all organizations worldwide to assess their sustainability performance and disclose the re-
sults in a similar way to financial reporting. gri is a non-profit organization that pioneered sustainability 
reporting; released in 2013, g4 is the fourth generation of its renowned sustainability reporting frame-
work. in 2014, more than 5,000 organizations across more than 90 countries have used the gri guidelines 
for their sustainability reporting, and 25 countries or regions have referred, mentioned, or recommended 
the guidelines in their policies, regulations, or other instruments. https://www.globalreporting.org/pag-
es/default.aspx (accessed on 11 February 2015)
12   For further details: D. Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance Regulation: 
Disclosure, Dialogue and Development, ross school of business working paper No. 1112, July 2008. 
13   l. loss, cited by: D.J. Doorey, „who made that?: influencing foreign labour practices through reflexive 
domestic disclosure regulation”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal vol. 43, No. 4, 2005, p. 372.
14   C. estlund, „Just the facts: the case for workplace transparency”, Stanford Law Review, vol. 63 January 
2011, p. 357. 
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rests on institutional preconditions: systematic guarantees of compliance with standards 
require organisational structure within each company that integrates respect for labour 
law regulations and translates it into personnel policy instruments.”15 The transparency 
of non-financial (in our case: social) information might indirectly improve the quality of 
such institutional preconditions for compliance. 
The main general, possible benefits and risks of transparency (non-financial reporting) 
are summarized in the table below (both for companies and for the public / society).
The main benefits and risks of transparency (non-financial reporting) for 
companies and for the public (society)
Companies Public (society)
benefits -   improved public image, social 
legitimacy and acceptance
-   promotion, marketing, pr
-   risk-management
-   better, more responsive 
self-regulation, internal 
self-reflection
-   improved institutional precon-
ditions for compliance 
-   comparable, transparent, easily 
available public information 
about companies
-   open communication and fair 
competition
-   “race to the top”
-   improved (legal) compliance 
-   mobilisation of stakeholders
-   improved accountability of 
companies
risks -   increased public scrutiny, 
pressure and demand for 
accountability
-   reporting is a kind of adminis-
trative and financial burden 
-   the danger of non-well-targeted 
reporting
-   possible loss of social 
acceptance
-   reporting might remain a 
box-ticking exercise, or simple 
pr-activity
-   non-well-targeted, unstruc-
tured, non-comparable, confus-
ing, inaccurate etc. reporting 
-   misleading reporting
Table 1 The author’s own summary. 
besides the voluntary, Csr-based developments, social reporting is increasingly ap-
pearing on the legislative agenda. The european Commission has announced in 2011 that 
the eU is preparing a legislative proposal on the transparency of the social and environ-
15   Kocher, Klose, Kühn, wenckebach, ´No accountability without transparency - legal instruments for 
Corporate Duties to Disclose working and employment Conditions´, FES, June 2012, p. 5. 
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mental information provided by companies in all sectors.16 some member states (like 
France17, Denmark18, UK19, sweden20) have already introduced progressive non-financial 
disclosure requirements that in some cases even go beyond existing eU legislation. How-
ever, as the Commission observes, legislative requirements on non-financial reporting are 
not widespread through member states but this is more common in countries with an 
established tradition of Csr or state-owned enterprises. other countries are starting the 
process by conducting pilot activities or using the international guidelines.21
The antecedent of the new Directive (Directive 2014/95/eU about disclosure of non-fi-
nancial and diversity information) is the so-called modernisation Directive 2003/51/eC 
which requires enterprises to disclose in their annual reports environmental and employ-
ee-related information ‘to the extent necessary’ for an understanding of the company’s 
development, performance or position. The requirements of this piece of eU-legislation 
have proved to be unclear and ineffective and applied in different ways in different mem-
ber states.22 Nevertheless, there is a general trend towards more government-driven, 
regulatory initiatives related to reporting.23 in the eU, most member states have imple-
mented some kind of measures for disclosure or provided companies with guidance or 
incentives to start reporting.24 in this context, the new Directive is a logical next step. 
16   a renewed eU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate social responsibility, brussels, 25.10.2011; Com(2011) 
681 final, p. 12. 
17   France was the first country to make public company reporting mandatory. The act of 15 may 2001 on 
new economic regulations (the “Ner” act) requires public companies to include information on a series of 
topics in their annual report: status of employees, mobility of staff, work hours, social relations, health and 
safety, training, health policy, profits distribution and the amount of outsourcing. They must also describe 
the ways in which their sub-contractors respect ilo standards. m. Doucin, France’s policy for reporting 
corporate social responsibility undertakings, French ministry of Foreign and european affairs, 2009. 
18   in Denmark, the 1,100 biggest companies, as well as state-owned companies, institutional investors, mu-
tual funds and listed financial businesses must provide information about their Csr policies on a “comply 
or explain” basis in their annual financial reports. CSR − National Public Policies in the European Union, 
european Commission, 2010. p. 26. For further details: K. buhmann, Company law as an agent for migra-
tion of CSR-related international law into companies self-regulation? The case of the Danish CSR reporting 
requirement, University of oslo, Faculty of law, legal studies research paper series No. 2011-05, oslo, 
2011.
19   ’business review’, Companies act 2006. 
20   starting in 2007, state-owned companies in sweden were legally required to publish sustainability reports 
according to the global reporting initiative (gri) framework.
21   CSR − National Public Policies in the European Union, Compendium, european Commission, 2014. p. 38.
22   J. Cremers, Non-financial reporting beyond the strict minimum: is the workforce a well-informed stakehold-
er?, etUi working paper 2013., brussels, 2013.
23   see also: proposals for “Establishing Mandatory Environmental and Social Reporting”, european Coalition 
For Corporate Justice (eCCJ) legal proposals to improve Corporate accountability for Human rights 
abuses (2008). 
24   CSR − National Public Policies in the European Union, european Commission, 2010, p. 26.
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richard Howitt, European Parliament Rapporteur on Corporate Social Responsibility, 
first proposed stricter rules on reporting in a european parliament report as long ago as 
1999. after long discussions25, the european Commission adopted on 16 april 2013 a pro-
posal for a new directive enhancing the transparency of certain large companies on social 
and environmental matters.26 The adopted Directive 2014/95/eU on disclosure of non-fi-
nancial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups amends the 
accounting Directive 2013/34/eU. The Directive entered into force on 6 December 2014. 
eU member states have two years to transpose it into national legislation. The concrete 
nature of the required disclosures will become clearer once national implementation has 
been drafted in 2016. reporting must start with business year 2017. in this context, the 
european Commission is organising informal transposition workshops to assist national 
authorities. The Directive has a ‘built-in’ review clause (art. 3), according to which the 
Commission shall submit a report to the european parliament and to the Council on the 
implementation of the Directive, including, among other aspects, its scope, particularly 
as regards large non-listed undertakings, its effectiveness and the level of guidance and 
methods provided. The report shall be published by 6 December 2018 and shall be accom-
panied, if appropriate, by legislative proposals. This provision ensures that the idea will 
remain on the agenda.
before analysing the Directive from a regulatory and a labour law perspective, the 
paper briefly highlights the most important recent streams of regulatory concepts which 
might be relevant both in terms of the Directive’s unique regulatory approach and of the 
future of labour-related regulation in general. 
iii. UNDerlyiNg tHeoretiCal CoNCerNs27  
From the perspective of regulatory theories, the following regulatory features and 
strands can be highly relevant to analyze the new Directive’s regulatory approach and 
to draw some wider conclusions concerning the trends of labour-related regulation in 
general. For the sake of simplicity, these regulatory concerns are addressed in ten points. 
25   For instance, the european Coalition for Corporate Justice (eCCJ) – a broad coalition representing Ngos, 
consumer groups, trade unions and academics -  has been heavily urging the legislative reform.
26   proposal for a Directive of the european parliament and the Council amending Council Directives 
78/660/eeC and 83/349/eeC as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain 
large companies and groups, Com/2013/0207 final. 
27   This Chapter heavily draws on the author’s paper: attila Kun, The semaphore versus the truncheon - New 
“energies” in labour regulation?, in: proceedings of the twelfth international Conference in Commemo-
ration of prof marco biagi, “Labour And Social Rights. An Evolving Scenario”, t. addabbo, w. bromwich, 
t.m. Fabbri, i. senatori, (eds.), marco biagi book series, n. 6, giappichelli, torino, 2015.
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a)   The idea of Csr (Corporate social responsibility) as an ideological root. 
b)   enhanced compliance with labour laws as a decisive goal of regulation.
c)   The broad, expanding understanding of labour law / labour regulation as a link to 
labour law.   
d)   indirect way of regulation: furthering the aims of labour law via non-labour law 
mechanisms.
e)   New governance and the concept of de-centred regulation as a doctrinaire founda-
tion of regulation.  
f )   reflexive law and responsive regulation as the dynamics of regulation (see also: 
regulated self-regulation). 
g)   From soft law to hard law, as a way of development. 
h)   employers’ organizational culture (governance structure) as the ultimate object of 
regulation. 
i)   Non- or extra- legal forces as regulatory incentives. 
k)   enhanced market-conformity of regulation (as an expectation of “law & economics”). 
below, the paper briefly reflects on these general theoretical baselines. 
3.1. The idea of Csr (Corporate social responsibility) as an ideological root. 
information disclosure as a regulatory strategy finds its roots in soft law, mostly in the 
concept and practice of Corporate social responsibility (Csr).28 it is possible to view Csr 
as an innovative, inspirational background-ideology, catalyst or guiding principle for such 
regulatory ideas. as an illustration, we can observe that the most recent, authoritative 
international standards and policies of Csr - on one way or another - are all referring to 
such innovative regulatory concepts as reporting. For instance, reporting as a concept is 
clearly manifested in the european Commission’s Communication “a renewed strategy 
2011–2014 for Corporate social responsibility” issued in october 2011 and in the  UN 
“guiding principles on business and Human rights: implementing the United Nations 
‘protect, respect and remedy’ Framework” proposed by UN special representative John 
ruggie.29
28   D. mcbarnet, a.voiculescu, t.Cambell, (eds.): The new Corporate Accountability − CSR and the law, 
Cambridge University press, 2007. 
29   http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinessHr_eN.pdf (accessed on 11 
February 2015)
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information disclosure as a regulatory strategy represents a sound combination of hard 
and soft law approaches. it tends to mix state regulation (e.g.: mandatory reporting) and 
private self-regulation (e.g.: reporting schemes). in this regard, the concepts of co-regu-
lation and meta-regulation30 might also be called upon. These regulatory strategies might 
step into the enforcement gap left open by traditional, ‘hard’ labour laws. 
3.2.   enhanced compliance with labour laws as a decisive goal of regulation.
Compliance (in general) has increasingly become a prevalent concern of both corpo-
rate management and academics.31 on the one hand, compliance is a status of being in 
accordance with established guidelines or legislation. as such, it is a complex combina-
tion of the fulfilment of legal (hard and soft) and non-legal expectations. on the other 
hand, compliance is also a process of becoming ‘compliant’. as such, it is dynamic and 
process-oriented. From a pure legal point of view, compliance usually refers to behaviour 
in accordance with legislation. as such, the ultimate goal of compliance is a behavioural 
transformation. ideally, it is not a ‘box-ticking’ exercise. Compliance is both about inter-
nal corporate attitude and ‘responsive’ reflection to external expectations, such as mar-
ket-based influences. 
The increasing need for compliance stems from the widely recognized fact that there 
is a so-called crisis in labour law32 and the obvious limitations of traditional labour law 
mechanisms. moreover, some scholars also bring into question the very survival of labour 
law33, others simply state that the implementation of labour law suffers from a structural 
30   m.m. rahim, ´meta-regulation approach of law: a potential legal strategy to Develop socially respon-
sible business selfregulation in least Developed Common law Countries´, 40 Comm. L. World Rev., 2011, 
pp. 174-206. 
31   about compliance in labour law, see: r. pires, 2008: promoting sustainable compliance: styles of labour 
inspection and compliance outcomes in brazil, International Labour Review, vol. 147, No. 2–3, 2008; 
Compliance with labour legislation: its efficacy and efficiency = respect de la législation du travail : effec-
tivité et impact / edited by g. Casale, a. perulli; international labour office, labour administration and 
inspection programme (lab/aDmiN),  geneva: ilo, 2010, working document; No.6; F. maschmann, 
Corporate Compliance und Arbeitsrecht, mannheimer arbeitsrechtstag 2009; a. mengel, Compliance und 
Arbeitsrecht, implementierung, Durchsetzung, organisation, verlag C.H.beCK, münchen, 2009; J.t.le-
lley, Compliance im Arbeitsrecht, leitfaden für die praxis, 1. auflage, luchterhand, 2010; p. macklem, 
m.trebilcock, New Labour Standards Compliance Strategies: Corporate Codes of Conduct and Social 
Labeling Programs, Faculty of law, University of toronto, a research report prepared for the Federal 
labour standards review, 2006. 
32   Cf.: g. Davidov, ´The enforcement Crisis in labour law and the Fallacy of voluntarist solutions´,  Inter-
national Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, vol. 26, 2010, pp. 61-82;  r.Zahn, 
‘Crisis in Labour Law’, University of Kingston, 11th may 2012: (with N. busby) ‘european labour law in 
Crisis: the Demise of social rights?’ etc.
33   Cf.: M. rigaux, J.buelens, a.latinne,  From Labour Law to Social Competition Law? intersentia, Cam-
bridge - antwerp - portland, 2014. pp. 9-11.
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deficiency in effectiveness.34 in general, labour law is widely considered to be in crisis: the 
ineffectiveness of traditional labour law is often recognized both by labour law scholars35 
and practitioners. in other words: all over the world, a constantly growing, large number 
of employers fail to comply with labour laws. it is also clear that there is a growing diver-
gence between the law and the reality of the employment relationship.36 as Davidov and 
langille give their justification, “one of the most salient aspects of the crisis in labour law 
is its inability in an increasing number of cases to deliver the necessary rights and entitle-
ments to workers”.37
many new normative, regulatory approaches − also in accordance with contemporary 
regulatory theories − prefer procedural rules over substantive rights.38 to put it different-
ly: they do not provide for new protective rights, they just focus on the innovative ways of 
stirring up compliance with existing standards. Furthermore, instead of guaranteeing new 
rights, they tend to facilitate internal corporate reflection and self-regulation. information 
disclosure as a regulatory strategy totally fits into these tendencies. 
3.3    The broad, expanding understanding of labour law / labour regulation as a 
link to labour law.   
as a starting point, the broadening and expanding view of labour law and the grow-
ing plurality and the hybridization of labour law’s regulatory mechanisms are to be men-
tioned.39 Nowadays, more and more labour law scholars are arguing in favour of a broader, 
extended view of labour law. it is not at all easy to clearly define the ideas of labour law in 
a changing world.40 even if we treat labour law as an ideologically stable, independent and 
coherent branch of law, there is a continuous and vital need to explore innovative ways 
of regulation and enforcement. Thus, the plurality and the hybridization of labour law’s 
regulatory mechanisms are recognized by many. Harry arthurs, for example, states that 
“labour law itself is likely to evolve into a broader, more inclusive and perhaps more effi-
cacious regime of social ordering, field of intellectual inquiry and domain of professional 
34  Kocher, Klose, Kühn, wenckebach, 2012, p. 5. 
35   g. Davidov and b.langille (eds.), 2011, introduction.  
36   The Employment Relationship, international labour Conference, ilo, 95th session, 2006, report v(1). p. 15. 
37   g. Davidov and b.langille, Understanding Labour Law: A Timeless Idea, a Timed-Out Idea, or an Idea 
Whose Time has Now Come, in g. Davidov and b.langille (eds.), The Idea of Labour Law, Oxford, oxford 
University press, 2011, pp. 1-13. 
38   Cf.: A. goldin, global Conceptualizations and local Constructions, in Davidov, guy & langille, p. 74.
39   Cf.: U. mückenberger, Hybrid Global Labour Law, cited in r.blanpain, F.Hendrickx (eds.), Labour Law 
Between Change and Tradition, Liber Amicorum Antoine Jacobs, alphen aan de rijn: Kluwer, 2011, pp. 
99-116. 
40   see in details about the various contemporary ideas of labour law: g. Davidov and b.langille (eds.)
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practice”. He also acknowledges that “labour law scholarship will have to extend its reach 
to all policy domains that influence work relations or labour market outcomes”.41 similar-
ly, vosko argues for “broadening labour law’s focus from employment relations to work 
or labour market relations” in general.42 Karl Klare also envisages a colourful and vibrant 
regulatory terrain for labour law when he states that the law regulating work cannot be 
fitted into a single overarching paradigm and labour law must pursue many different ap-
proaches.43 langille also believes in the expansion of labour law’s justificatory horizons.44 
while manfred weiss does not see a vital need for a change of paradigm in labour law, 
he also recognizes some need for adaptation and the necessity for labour law to respond 
to the new realities in the area of employment in its broadest sense.45 as we have seen 
before, regulators are under pressure to explore innovative ways to create facilitators for 
businesses for more general and systematic compliance with labour laws. in line with the 
pluralist concept of labour regulation, Howe states that a “broader view of what consti-
tutes labour law is crucial to the future health and vitality of labour law scholarship.”46 
The broadening scope of labour law can also be conceptualised in the mirror of regu-
latory theory.47 according to this thinking, labour law can be seen as a broad ‘regulatory 
space’ instead of a narrowly defined branch of law. a ‘regulatory space’ is defined by the 
wide array of issues belonging to a given area of regulation. This ‘space’ may be filled by 
a range of various regulatory methods and approaches, among which hard and soft law 
measures, traditional and innovative regulatory concepts are combined. in this context, 
information disclosure as a regulatory strategy might be a part of an extended concept of 
labour law, even if it doesn’t rely on the traditional mechanisms of labour law, but follows 
an alternative concept. information disclosure as a regulatory strategy is one example of 
these alternative concepts. 
3.4.    indirect ways of regulation: furthering the aims of labour law via non-labour 
law mechanisms.
New methods of enforcement strategies are needed, and these strategies often can be 
found beyond the conventional borders of labour law, sometimes in other fields of law. 
41  H. arthurs, labour law after labour, in g. Davidov and b. langille (eds.), pp. 27, 29. 
42  v. F. leah, Out of the shadow?, in g. Davidov and b. langille (eds.), p. 368. 
43   K. Karl, The Horizons of Transformative Labour Law and Employment law, in J. Conaghan, m Fischl, and 
K. Karl (eds.), Labour Law in the Era of Globalization, oxford University press, 2002, pp. 3-29. 
44   b. langille, Labour Law’s Theory of Justice, in g. Davidov and b. langille (eds.), p. 102.
45   m.weiss, re-inventing labour law, in g. Davidov and b.langille (eds.), pp. 43-57.
46   Cf.: J.Howe, The broad idea of labour law, in g. Davidov and b.langille (eds.), pp. 299-300.
47   C.Fenwick and t. Novitz, Conclusion: regulating to protect workers’ Human rights, Human Rights at 
Work, oregon, Hart publishing, 2010, pp. 585-617. 
49Attila Kun: REDIRECTING THE REGULATORY FOCUS OF LABOUR LAW – FROM THE CONTRACT...
Thus, one of the several possible ways of broadening the scope of labour law is the build-
ing up of more strategic and organic, more coherent links with other, related branches 
and fields of law. This idea is also in line with mitchell and arup’s theory: they argue for 
the reformulation of labour law as the ’law of labour market regulation’, dismantling disci-
plinary boundaries among work-related distinctive areas of law (such as company law, for 
instance).48 indeed, the labour Code in a country (if any as such) is far from comprising 
all labour-related regulation. without doubt, the regulatory terrain and the complexity of 
labour law are expanding. This argument is also in line with the concept of the so-called 
legal homogeneity. as rigaux formulates it, in a comprehensive legal perspective, “law is 
considered to form a homogenous entity within which legal rules of a different nature and 
of a different origin interact.”49 
information disclosure as a regulatory strategy is clearly outside the conventional, 
‘mainstream’ scope of labour law, but it can have direct impact on the level of working 
conditions. mandated transparency of company-related social information might have 
the potential to contribute to the enhanced compliance with labour laws. innovative reg-
ulatory strategies as social reporting might also serve various labour-related ends, even if 
they are not ‘labour laws’ in a strict sense (such as socially responsible public procurement 
law, company law dealing with non-financial reporting etc.). The original, to a large extent 
still valid - but heavily discussed - basic purposes and values of labour law (i.e. ‘protection’, 
redistribution of powers etc.) can be followed through different regulatory mechanisms. 
among these mechanisms, other branches of law (such as public procurement law, com-
pany law, consumer protection law etc.) can also play a fruitful role. 
3.5.    New governance and the concept of de-centred regulation as a doctrinaire 
foundation of regulation.  
The regulatory theory, in its conventional understanding, responds to the above men-
tioned enforcement crisis existing in contemporary law, in our closer perspective, espe-
cially in labour law. as Fenwick and Novitz formulate it, “regulation theory is to explore 
the weakness in practice of such a ‘command and control’ (hereinafter: CaC) approach to 
regulation, and of how regulators might respond to those limits in innovative ways.”50 This 
broader approach to regulation captures a wider range of regulatory ideas and techniques. 
in terms of labour law, the scope and regulatory strategies of labour law should be de-
ployed in different ways than might conventionally be understood. a clear experimentalist 
tendency is detectable as the idea and the style of regulation moves away from purely con-
48   Cited by: J.Fudge, labour as a ’Fictive Commodity’: radically reconceptualizing labour law, g. Davidov 
and b. langille (eds.), p. 125.  
49  rigaux, buelens, latinne (eds.), op. cit, p. 2. 
50   C. Fenwick and t. Novitz, p. 605. 
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tract-oriented, command and control employment regulation to more innovative meth-
ods of regulation. some authors use the notion of ‘new governance’51 and/or the concept 
of de-centred regulation52 as umbrella terms for such modern regulatory ideas.53 These 
regulatory approaches are trying to reflect changes in society and growing complexities of 
the regulated subjects. in brief, new governance regulation is collaborative, participatory, 
innovative, complex (i.e. public and private mix), experimental, process-oriented, flexible, 
expansive and decentralized.54 as estlund formulates it, new governance is “one umbrella 
term for a range of post-command-and-control strategies for social control of economic 
organizations and activity.”55
3.6.    reflexive law and responsive regulation as the dynamics of regulation (see 
also: regulated self-regulation). 
The new regulatory approaches described above are in line with teubneriean logic 
of reflexive law56, because they are trying to influence the internal decision-making pro-
cesses of employers. Furthermore, in the framework of such innovative regulatory ideas, 
top-down state regulation is combined with market-based measures and initiatives. For 
example, disclosure / reporting measures may induce internal reflection of enterprises 
about their own employment practices and social policies. in this sense, such a legal strat-
egy is also responsive to the needs of economic actors.57
to put it differently: such regulatory approaches can be considered to be one tool for 
reflexively and responsively implementing the values and ends of labour law. in these reg-
51   o. lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, legal studies research paper series, research paper No. 07-27, University of san Diego, De-
cember 2005.  
52   J. black, Decentring regulation: Understanding the role of regulation and self-regulation in a “post-reg-
ulatory world, Cur. Leg. Problems, vol. 53, no. 103, 2001
53   b.p. Haar, Open method of coordination. An analysis of its meaning for the development of a social Europe, 
amsterdam, leiden University, 2012, pp. 24-28. 
54   Cf.: D. Doorey, a model of responsive workplace law, Osgoode Hall L. J., vol. 50, 2012, p. 47. 
55   C. estlund, Just the facts: the case for workplace transparency, Stanford Law Review, vol. 63, January 2011, 
p. 354;
56   about reflexive law, see: g. teubner, ‘substantive and reflexive elements in modern law’, Law & Society 
Review, vol. 17. No. 2, 1983; g. teubner, ‘Corporate Responsibility as a Problem of Company Consti-
tution’,1983 eUi working paper No. 51, badia Fiesolana, san Domenico (Fi); r. rogowski, t.wilthagen 
(eds.), ‘Reflexive Labour Law’ Kluwer law and taxation publishers; C. barnard, s. Deakin, r. Hobbs, ‘Re-
flexive law, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Evolution of Labour Standards: The Case of Working 
Time’ (2004) esrC Centre for business research, University of Cambridge working paper No. 294, Cbr 
research programme on Corporate governance. 
57   about responsive regulation: i. ayres and J. braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregu-
lation Debate, New york,  oxford University press, 1992. 
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ulatory ideas the conventionally reactive (sanctioning) nature of labour laws is replaced by 
a rather proactive attitude. as Hess points out, “the ultimate goal of a reflexive law - and 
New governance - approach is to ensure that corporations are meaningfully thinking 
‘critically, creatively, and continually’ about their social performance and how to improve 
it.”58 This is also one of the main goals of mandatory social reporting. 
3.7.    From soft law to hard law, as a way of development. 
many innovative regulatory methods find their roots in soft law59 and in the concept 
and practice of Corporate social responsibility (Csr). For example, responsible pro-
curement, social reporting, or supply chain controlling practices are all well grounded 
and proliferated in - especially transnational - private, non-governmental soft regulation. 
Normally, these practices are applied under public social pressure rather than as a result 
of state regulation. However, one of the classical functions of soft law is the so-called 
‘pre-law’ function: soft law measures may have the capacity for ‘hardening’, since they 
can be a first step in the process of legislation.60 soft law measures can also be a so-called 
‘testing field’ of innovative regulatory concepts and source of inspiration or pattern for 
regulators. as such, ideas in soft law may pave the path for the adoption of hard laws in 
the future. This phenomenon can also be labelled as the ‘spill over’ function of soft law61 
and can represent the dynamic of a given field of law (in our case, the dynamic of labour 
law as a widely interpreted ‘space’ of regulation). However, it must be mentioned that hard 
law is generally lagging behind changes in self-regulatory practices and regulatory ideas. 
Furthermore, in these specific regulatory terrains (e.g. procurement, reporting, supply 
chain responsibility) extensive legal regulation could significantly undermine respective 
competitive market dynamics (thus, hard regulation is not always and not in all aspects 
necessarily needed). social reporting is obviously a good example for this ‘hardening’ pro-
cess. it seems to be a tendency that voluntary best practices are gradually becoming ’the 
regulatory norm’.
58   D. Hess, social reporting and New governance regulation: The prospects of achieving Corporate ac-
countability through transparency, Business Ethics Quarterly, volume 17, issue 3., 2007, p. 470. 
59   see for the general description of the role of soft law in labour law: i. Duplessis, soft international labour 
law: The preferred method of regulation in a decentralized society, in: Governance, International Law 
& Corporate Social Responsibility, international institute for labour studies, research series 116., ilo, 
2008; r. blanpain, and m. Colucci, The Globalization of Labour Standards, The Soft Law Track, Kluwer 
law international. 
60   Cf.: senden, Soft Law in European Community Law, oxford, Hart publishing, 2004.
61   Cf.: m.a. alhambra, b. ter Haar and a. Kun, ‘soft on the inside, Hard on the outside: an analysis of 
the legal Nature of New Forms of international labour law’. The International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations, vol. 27, no. 4, 2011, pp. 337–363.
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3.8.    employers’ organizational culture and corporate attitude as the ultimate 
object of regulation. 
The nature of state intervention is presumed to alter in the context of these innovative 
regulatory concepts: the law should play a triggering, activating role in relation to corpo-
rate self-regulation, instead of a “policing” approach. legal interventions should rather 
be well-directed, forceful ‘semaphores’ instead of purely hard-hitting ‘truncheons’. in oth-
er words, the state (the regulator) should rather be a ‘chorus-master’ than a ‘policeman’. 
The ultimate goal of these innovative regulatory practices is in fact to effectuate a behav-
ioural change on the side of employers, in order to progressively uphold decent working 
conditions. on the one hand, compliance with applicable (labour) laws is the absolute 
minimum. on the other hand, truly socially responsible - Csr-conscious - attitude is the 
desired other end of this attitudinal transformation. The behavioural change leading to 
compliance and to social responsibility might be motivated by way of various regulatory 
mechanisms. in such cases the state tries to steer and guide internal corporate governance 
mechanisms to capture certain public policy goals (such as enhanced compliance with 
labour laws).  
3.9.    Non- or extra- legal forces as regulatory incentives. 
The main purpose of the paper is to point out that ‘fresh’, non-legal, market-based forc-
es, energies of labour law compliance are emerging, and these energies might be effective-
ly triggered and catalysed by innovative regulatory mechanisms. even if these regulatory 
mechanisms (such as non-financial disclosure) are grounded in soft law and Csr, they 
are on a so-called “hardening” way of progression and can be conceptualised as promising 
fields of legal development. 
The perceived new energies and powers furthering labour law compliance are, among 
others, the following: market-based, financial, relational, risk-based and reputational in-
centives. all of these drivers can be found behind the idea of information disclosure as a 
regulatory strategy. accompanying legal interventions (such as the obligation to report, as 
in the new eU-Directive analysed below) should have the goal to reflexively embed these 
market-based incentives into corporate self-regulatory practices, and to guide, intensify 
and guarantee related corporate policies. 
3.10.    enhanced market-conformity of regulation (as an expectation of “law & 
economics”).  
These new regulatory ideas typically aim to create positive incentives as an attempt to 
solve the deep compliance problems. such innovative enforcement strategies are typically 
not intruding into the market as harshly as conventional labour laws, they rather have a 
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market-friendly regulatory approach and a ‘market constituting’ / ‘market-creating’ role.62 
in other words: these regulatory methods often create a ‘business case’ for compliance, 
what is apparently an important added-value and facilitator for employers. The ‘business 
case’ can be manifested, for instance, in image (brand)-based incentives (such as in the 
case of non-financial disclosure and reporting). The ‘business case’ behind these regulato-
ry techniques might have the potential to appease the classical economic critiques of the 
field of labour law.63 such regulatory approaches are trying to find a better, more respon-
sive balance between regulatory (social) goals and the logic of routine business practices 
(such as information disclosure). in other words: regulation - indirectly and smoothly - 
tries to implant some social dimension into customary business practices (such as report-
ing). These regulatory methods can also be interpreted as more business-friendly, softer 
advancements of labour law’s original values. They permit employers to experiment and 
comply proactively and creatively. 
Harry arthurs acknowledges that “market dynamics are often a more powerful deter-
minant of decent labour standards than regulatory legislation.”64 it means that in some 
cases private, market-based, self-regulatory (soft law) mechanisms can also be a source 
of innovation in terms of compliance. Furthermore, regulatory methods can utilize and 
catalyze such market dynamics. owing to their market-friendly nature, such regulatory 
approaches are also often labelled as ‘light-touch’ regulation.65  
iv.  DireCtive 2014/95/eU - CoNteNt, CoNteXt aND 
CoNCeptUalisatioN From a laboUr law 
perspeCtive
This Chapter describes the main features of Directive 2014/95/eU on disclosure of 
non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups amend-
ing the accounting Directive 2013/34/eU from a labour law perspective. Furthermore, 
this Chapter aims to show how the general regulatory concepts and ideas (described brief-
ly in Chapter 2) are reflected in the Directive’s approach.
62   Cf.: S. Deakin, The Contribution of labour law to economic and Human Development, in: g. Davidov 
and b.langille (eds.), pp. 156-179.
63   Cf.: R. Del punta, The economic Challenge to labour law, in: Compliance with labour legislation: its ef-
ficacy and efficiency, ilo lab/aDmiN, working Document No. 6., Jan. 2010. about law & economics: 
bouckaert, boudewijn & De geest, gerrit (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume I. The His-
tory and Methodology of Law and Economics, Cheltenham, edward elgar, 2000. 
64   H. arthurs, p. 18. 
65   J. Howe, The Regulatory Impact of Using Public Procurement to Promote Better Labour in Corporate Supply 
Chains, legal studies research papers No. 528, melbourne law school, 2010, p. 4. 
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The Directive is not a labour law Directive. Nevertheless, mandatory reporting might 
indirectly influence labour law-related issues, as described above (see: Chapter 2, d.). The 
Directive is closely linked to regulations concerning financial disclosure. in fact, it amends 
an earlier directive that regulates corporate annual financial statements, consolidated fi-
nancial statements, and related reports.66 
The objective of the new Directive is to enhance the relevance, consistency and compa-
rability of non-financial information disclosed throughout the Union in order to  increase 
eU companies’ transparency and performance on environmental and social matters, and, 
therefore, to contribute effectively to long-term economic growth and employment. in 
the eU Directive the management report is specified as the default part of corporate re-
porting where the non-financial statement should be included. However, it also allows 
companies to issue the non-financial statement as a separate report if it covers the same 
financial year as the management report. The directive also requires that the statutory 
auditor or audit firm verify whether the non-financial statement has been provided.67
The new Directive requires companies concerned to disclose in their management 
report, information on policies, risks and outcomes as regards environmental matters, so-
cial and employee aspects, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, 
and diversity in their board of directors. The non-financial statement should also include 
information on the due diligence processes implemented by the undertaking, also regard-
ing, where relevant and proportionate, its supply and subcontracting chains, in order to 
identify, prevent and mitigate existing and potential adverse impacts. as such, materiality 
assessment is extended to include the supply chain. in sum, the Directive requests the 
same points of disclosure for each sustainability matter: 
-   a description of the policy pursued by the undertaking in relation to those matters, 
including due diligence processes implemented; 
-   the outcome of those policies; 
-   the principal risks related to those matters linked to the undertaking’s operations 
including, where relevant and proportionate, its business relationships, products or 
services which are likely to cause adverse impacts in those areas, and how the under-
taking manages those risks; 
-   non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business.
it should be possible for member states to exempt undertakings which are subject to 
this Directive from the obligation to prepare a non-financial statement when a separate 
report corresponding to the same financial year and covering the same content is provid-
66   b. Kasemir, impact of the eU Directive on Non-Financial reporting, 
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2015/08/06/impact-of-the-eu-directive-on-non-financial-report-
ing/ (accessed on 12 December 2015) 
67   http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/non-financial_reporting/ (accessed on 15 may 2015)
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ed. The core idea of the Directive is that such reporting should provide investors and other 
stakeholders with a more comprehensive picture of a company’s performance. This is a 
legislative initiative with relevance for the european economic area (eea).
The new rules will only apply to some large companies with more than 500 employ-
ees. This includes listed companies as well as other public-interest entities (pie), such 
as banks, insurance companies, and other companies that are so designated by mem-
ber states because of their significant public relevance, activities, size or number of em-
ployees. according to estimations, the scope includes approx. 6 000 large companies and 
groups across the eU. as such, this regulatory strategy is rather experimentalist in this 
stage (as most ‘new governance’-type regulatory strategies), but it might have the poten-
tial to further expand in the future. 
There are some exceptional rules in the Directive, which further increase its flexibili-
ty. For instance, it contains a rather broadly formulated, optional ‘safe Harbour Clause’: 
member states may allow information relating to impending developments or matters 
in the course of negotiation to be omitted in exceptional cases where, in the duly justi-
fied opinion of the members of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies, 
acting within the competences assigned to them by national law and having collective 
responsibility for that opinion, the disclosure of such information would be seriously prej-
udicial to the commercial position of the undertaking, provided that such omission does 
not prevent a fair and balanced understanding of the undertaking’s development, perfor-
mance, position and impact of its activity. (art. 1, par. 1). 
Furthermore, a subsidiary undertaking may be exempted from the reporting obliga-
tion if its parent entity includes the non-financial statement in the consolidated manage-
ment report (art. 1, par. 3).  accordingly, companies that are not headquartered in the eU 
will also be impacted by mandatory reporting requirements: the non-eU headquartered 
corporations that do business in eU member states via local subsidiaries that fall under 
the Directive’s requirements. The Directive specifies that subsidiary undertakings shall 
be exempt from mandatory reporting if they are covered in a consolidated non-financial 
statement of their parent group that meets the Directive’s requirements. according to 
some opinions, many corporate group and holding companies will likely elect to publish 
a non-financial report that meets the eU requirements, probably at the strictest Directive 
implementation level from within those member states where they do business, rather 
than invest in having each of their subsidiaries do their own reporting.68
as the recital specifies it, as regards social and employee-related matters, the informa-
tion provided in the statement may concern the actions taken to ensure gender equality, 
implementation of fundamental conventions of the international labour organisation, 
working conditions, social dialogue, respect for the right of workers to be informed and 
68  b. Kasemir, 2015
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consulted, respect for trade union rights, health and safety at work and the dialogue with 
local communities, and/or the actions taken to ensure the protection and the develop-
ment of those communities (recital, para. 7). one general problem with social reporting 
is that it can mainly focus on empirically, objectively observable circumstances and thus 
can never give a full picture of companies’ social performance. Furthermore, the objectiv-
ity, validity and practicability of social indicators can always be doubted.69  
The Directive - in line with reflexive regulatory approaches, new governance consid-
erations and law & economics concerns - strives to ensure that administrative burdens 
are kept to a minimum. reporting is mandatory, but wide margin of flexibility is given 
to companies. The Directive has been designed with a non-prescriptive mind-set, and 
leaves significant flexibility for companies to disclose relevant information in the way that 
they consider most useful (one might also call it as ‘light touch’ regulatory approach, as 
described above). in this context, this Directive is a good example of reflexivity and re-
sponsiveness in regulation (as it is also an important feature of reflexive law that law must 
realise its systemic limits with respect to regulation of other social systems, such as the 
economy70). The recital plainly emphasizes the need to respect the “freedom to conduct 
a business” (para. 22), while, at the same time, the whole idea of the Directive is about 
softly regulating the routine business practice of reporting with a ‘social’ view. as such, 
the Directive is a good example of balancing between the interventionalist and ‘laissez 
fair’ approaches towards the market. The Directive - in any case - intends to send a strong 
signal to the market. However, the intention of the Directive might be watered down to 
various degrees in different member states, as the Directive regulatory approach is ex-
tremely flexible. 
The Directive’s regulatory concept is substantially process-oriented inasmuch as it 
strives to boost the change-managing potential of affected companies (cf. recital, para. 
3). accordingly, the Directive’s regulatory concept is also reflexive, inasmuch as it tries to 
influence the internal decision-making processes of companies (in our context: employ-
ers). The encouragement of ‘due diligence processes’ (art. 1, par. 1, b.) also reflects the 
procedural nature of the regulatory concept applied. The reporting process is supposed 
to be embedded in the heart of the organization’s business strategy and it shouldn’t be a 
simple tick box exercise. similarly, the responsiveness of the Directive’s regulatory con-
cept is reflected in the goal to help the measuring, monitoring and managing of under-
takings’ performance and their impact on society by information disclosure (cf. recital, 
para. 3). This concern also reveals that reporting is not only valuable for stakeholders (to 
make more informed decisions and hold companies accountable), but - as a management 
tool - it has advantages for companies too (e.g. to identify risks). in other words, there is 
69  Kocher, Klose, Kühn, wenckebach, p. 10. 
70   r. rogowski, Reflexive Labour Law in the World Society, edward elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, p. 39. 
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a business case in reporting (which is important from a “law and economics” perspective, 
see Chapter 2. j.). 
The Directive’s regulatory concept is ‘risk-based’ as it assumes that information dis-
closure might help identifying sustainability risks and increasing investor and consumer 
trust (recital, para. 3). Furthermore, as regards the content of the reports, companies 
should provide “adequate information in relation to matters that stand out as being most 
likely to bring about the materialisation of principal risks of severe impacts, along with 
those that have already materialised” (recital, para. 8). This approach is the concept of 
materiality. as such, reporting should be based on a risk-oriented approach. 
The Directive applies a public and private mix of regulatory mechanisms and it strives 
to find a delicate balance between the stability of regulation and the flexibility of mandat-
ed self-regulation.71 as the recital formulate this: the Directive allows “for high flexibility 
of action, in order to take account of the multidimensional nature of corporate social 
responsibility (Csr) and the diversity of the Csr policies implemented by businesses 
matched by a sufficient level of comparability to meet the needs of investors and other 
stakeholders as well as the need to provide consumers with easy access to information on 
the impact of businesses on society.” (recital, para. 3) Thus, the Directive sets the ‘floor’ 
for reporting and creates a level playing field, while leaves companies wide margin to in-
novate towards higher self-regulatory standards. after all, the Directive intends to steer 
self-regulation: by complying with the requirements, companies will have a better under-
standing of the risks they face, and will be pressured internally and externally to act (and 
to self-regulate) to reduce these risks.72
The Directive offers many instances for innovatively combining hard and soft regula-
tory approaches. For instance, when reporting, companies may use recognised interna-
tional or national guidelines which they consider appropriate (for instance, the UN global 
Compact, iso 26000, the guiding principles on business and Human rights implement-
ing the UN ‘protect, respect and remedy’ Framework, the organisation for economic 
Co-operation and Development (oeCD) guidelines for multinational enterprises, the 
international organisation for standardisation’s iso 26000, the international labour or-
ganisation’s tripartite Declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and 
social policy, the global reporting initiative73, or other recognised international frame-
71   Cf.: “smart mix” between regulation and voluntarism in the ruggie-framework. 
72   assessment of the eU Directive on the disclosure of non-financial information by certain large companies, 
eCCJ briefing, may 2014, p. 3. 
73   The gri have also played an important role during the development of the Directive by providing ex-
pertise. Furthermore, gri g4 is fully aligned with the requirements of the Directive, so it can be a fun-
damental tool for companies during the implementation. The gri might enhance the spill-over effect of 
the Directive, also beyond the eU. see for further details: making Headway in europe: linking g4 and 
the european Directive on non-financial and diversity disclosure, gri https://www.globalreporting.org/
resourcelibrary/gri_g4_eU%20Directive_linkage.pdf (accessed on 1 June 2015)
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works, see recital, para. 9). as such, the Directive explicitly builds on the Csr-related 
roots and practices. Furthermore, according to article 2, “the Commission shall prepare 
non-binding guidelines on methodology for reporting non-financial information, includ-
ing non-financial key performance indicators, general and sectoral, with a view to facili-
tating relevant, useful and comparable disclosure of non-financial information by under-
takings.” in doing so, the Commission shall consult relevant stakeholders. The Commis-
sion shall publish the guidelines by 6 December 2016. This kind of ‘soft’, supplementary 
guidance on reporting also reflects a mixed, hybrid (hard and soft) regulatory approach. 
The Directive clearly applies techniques developed in the realm of Csr. For instance, 
the so-called ‘comply or explain’ principle is clearly manifested in the Directive: “where 
the undertaking does not pursue policies in relation to one or more of those matters, the 
non-financial statement shall provide a clear and reasoned explanation for not doing so.” 
(art. 1, par. 1). Furthermore, the Directive motivates private auditing when it recalls in 
its recital (para. 16.) that statutory auditors and audit firms should only check that the 
non-financial statement or the separate report has been provided. in addition, it should 
be possible for member states to require that the information included in the non-finan-
cial statement or in the separate report be verified by an independent assurance services 
provider (art. 1, par. 6).
The Directive’s regulatory concept is also expansive and innovative in a sense that the 
required non-financial statement should also include information on the due diligence 
processes implemented by the undertaking, also regarding, where relevant and propor-
tionate, its supply and subcontracting chains, in order to identify, prevent and mitigate 
existing and potential adverse impacts. The references to due diligence and to the supply 
chain are important, but rather symbolic achievements. on the one hand, there is no 
clear guidance on what due diligence should really mean. on the other hand, reporting on 
supply chain is only required ‘where relevant and proportionate’, which formulation might 
lead to diverging interpretation. 
The Directive’s regulatory concept is also participative inasmuch as it relies on and 
empowers stakeholders (Ngos, communities, workers, consumers etc.) to pressure com-
panies to produce more robust reports and to hold companies accountable for negative 
impacts. 
as we have already mentioned, the Directive is rather experimentalist in its current 
form (similarly to most ‘new governance’-type regulatory strategies), as its scope is quite 
limited (approx. 6 000 large companies). However, it might have the potential to further 
expand its scope in the future (see the above-mentioned ‘built-in’ review clause). accord-
ing to some experts, the number of companies ultimately affected may be much higher 
than initially expected (because of various approaches of national implementation). Fur-
thermore, if those companies required to report start asking their suppliers to provide 
them non-financial (social etc.) information for their reports, all companies doing busi-
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ness with them will feel the pressure of increasing Cr disclosure expectations as well.74 
These are possible spill-over effects of the Directive. 
it could be a next step to ensure that misleading information provided by companies 
in non-financial reports can be effectively challenged and sanctioned. Certain consum-
er protection law, unfair competition law mechanisms are in principle applicable in this 
sense, but further clarification is needed in this respect. other prospects for development 
for the future can be to supplement the duty to disclosure with mandatory auditing and 
assurance, to systematically test the correctness and validity of the disclosed data, to ex-
tend the personal scope of the reporting obligation, to institutionalize the rights of associ-
ations (Ngos, trade unions) for class action and to organize structural public support for 
reporting (e.g. governmental guides, promotional activities, guidelines, incentives etc.). 
one might suspect that regulating the duty to report as such in not necessarily sufficient 
in itself. as one study about social reporting in general concludes, “without influential 
procedures for enforcing the duties of disclosure, a new regulation is in danger of remain-
ing ineffective.”75 This might also be true for the new eU-Directive, even if it represents a 
promising idea, as described above.  
v.  CoNClUsioNs - tHe CHaNgiNg CHaraCter oF laboUr 
regUlatioN?  
on the one hand, the Directive might be far from being perfect and far from being 
a ‘miracle’. There are many regulatory options about this Directive owing to its tremen-
dously flexible regulatory approach. its ultimate added-value will largely depend on the 
methods of implementation on the level of member states and, at the end of the day, on 
affected firms’ willingness to meaningfully comply. on the other hand, the Directive’s 
main, strong message - mandatory reporting - might mark an important initial step in the 
‘juridification’ (or positivization) of Csr-related soft laws. Furthermore, it might mirror 
some important, on-going paradigm-shifts in labour law (or in labour-related regulation 
in a wider sense) in general and might open the door for similarly innovative legislative 
developments.
such innovative regulatory methods as mandatory non-financial reporting are clear 
examples of the fact that the legal sources of labour law in a wide sense and the legal 
strategies aimed at the advancement of labour law-compliance can be increasingly multi-
faceted, dispersed and decentred and can also be found beyond the conventional ‘brack-
ets’ of labour law. taken into account the well-known recent low willingness and ability 
74  b. Kasemir
75   Kocher, Klose, Kühn, wenckebach, p. 27.
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of the eU to pass ‘direct’ social policy, labour law legislation76, such ‘indirect’, innovative 
ways of regulating ‘social’ matters - as it is the case with mandatory non-financial report-
ing - should be appreciated. if there seems to be a ‘moratorium’ on any eU legislation in 
the fields of ‘classical’ labour law77, such indirect ways of regulation should be especially 
valued as promising supplementary regulatory mechanisms. The strategy to creatively 
implant and ‘smuggle’ some ‘social’ dimension into routine business practices as reporting 
seems to replace ‘direct’ social regulatory expectations. 
as we have seen, information disclosure as a basically company law-related regulato-
ry strategy has some evident links to labour law, especially from a compliance-oriented 
perspective. However, at the same time, such innovative regulatory methods alter and 
challenge some classical pillars of regulating labour law matters. among others, the fo-
cus (object) of regulation, the method of regulation, as well as the force of regulation are 
re-conceptualized and innovated. 
Firstly, if we analyze the main focus (object) of regulation, it is fair to generalize that 
traditional labour law takes the contract (i.e. the employment contract) as the basic pil-
lar and the main point of reference for regulation. This concept is often labelled as the 
‘vertragsprinzip’, symbolizing the civil law origins of labour law.78 it is apparently one 
of the most topical focal points of contemporary discussions of labour law scholarship, 
how the nature, the scope and the function of the employment contract are changing in 
modern times.79 as for information disclosure as a regulatory strategy, it takes the em-
ployer - and its market position, organizational culture and self-regulatory potential - as 
the most important target of regulation. it tries to boost and build on the ‘social respon-
sibility’ of employers80 instead of focusing on the contract. in other words, such methods 
76   as schlachter formulates it in general: “The probability of convincing the european Council into so-
cial policy legislation has become more difficult the more members are present, and due to a striking 
economic crisis, social policy in many member states tends to be among the first items to be reduced.” 
m. schlachter, Transnational collective bargaining and the institutionalized “social dialogue” at EU level, 
Conference paper, mta-pte research group of Comparative and european employment policy and 
labour law, recent Developments in labour law, pécs, Hungary, 2012, pp.25-26, http://mta-pte.ajk.pte.
hu/index.php?lang=hu&link=konferencia (accessed on 1 may 2015)
77   Cf.: t.müller, H.platzer, wolfgang, rüb, Transnational company agreements and the role of European 
Works Councils in negotiations, A quantitative analysis in the metalworking sector, etUi, report 127, 
brussels. p. 14. 
78   Cf.: R. richardi, Der arbeitsvertrag im Zivilrechtssystem, Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 1988/7, p.231.
79   Cf.:m. Freedland and N. Kountouris, The legal Characterization of personal work  relations and the 
idea of labour law, in:, g. Davidov and b. langille (eds.), pp. 190-209; m. Freedland and N. Kountouris, 
The legal Construction of personal work relations, Oxford Monographs in Labour Law, 2012; a. perulli, 
Economically dependent / quasi-subordinate (parasubordinate) employment: legal, social and economic 
aspects, Committee on employment and social affairs of the european parliament and Dg employment 
and employment and social affairs, brussels, 2003;  gyulavári tamás, a foglalkoztatásijogviszonyokújdi-
menziója, Esély, 22. évf. 1. sz., 2011, pp. 3-23. 
80   see the links to the above-described concept of Csr (Chapter 1.). 
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of regulation become relatively independent of the contract and try to concentrate on 
employers’ responsibility. with this approach, it is possible to relieve labour regulation of 
analyzing the nature of the contract, while putting targeted regulatory pressure directly 
on employers’ attitude (for instance, how employers manage their ‘branding’ and its cred-
ibility via social reporting). in this context, regulation strives to give some risk-based ‘legal 
signals’81 for employers with the ambition of motivating compliance, self-regulation and 
social responsibility. 
secondly, the method of regulation is also under fundamental reconstruction in the 
ambit of innovative regulatory ideas. as we have already seen, a general tendency is de-
tectable as ‘hard-hitting’ command and control (CaC) regulation is increasingly rolled 
back in many fields of labour regulation while reflexive, responsive, softer and light-touch 
styles of regulation are gradually coming to the forefront. The emerging regulatory terrain 
of mandatory social reporting is among the best examples for such a paradigm-shift in 
regulation. it endeavours to bring together hard and soft law approaches, or regulation 
and self-regulation. it doesn’t intend to regulate with full force and in full details, but it 
leaves a large (but, to some extent, regulated) margin for self-regulation.82 in other words, 
regulation tries to express some targeted signals for responsible self-regulation. in this 
context, regulation is more of a shepherding rather than of a directing nature. social re-
porting regulation aims to steer responsible self-regulation by mandating a comparable, 
transparent public image. smart, indirect techniques of influencing corporate behaviour 
step into the place of traditional enforcement. 
Thirdly, the force of regulation (power, ‘energy’ of compliance) is also unusual under the 
innovative regulatory ideas. as a rough generalization, normative state regulation and the 
various tools of collective voice are the two basic traditional regulatory powers of labour 
law. These two classical powers are to be used for protecting employees and influencing 
employers’ behaviour. These classical regulatory powers are harshly intruding into the 
market-logic or at least correcting the market.83 on the other hand, information disclo-
sure as a regulatory strategy (and other innovative regulatory ideas, such as responsible 
public procurement, subcontracting liability etc.) is increasingly building on market-based 
incentives of compliance. in other words, these regulatory concepts try to utilize the mar-
ket-based fact that employers can be motivated to comply with labour standards and be 
‘responsible’ not only under administrative, regulatory control and collective pressure, 
but also under some forms of market-based pressure. The market-based pressures and 
incentives are widespread, fluctuating and dynamic. such regulatory methods basically 
build on market-based incentives, reputational incentives (such as better ‘branding’ and 
81   D. Doorey, (2012): a model of responsive workplace law, Osgoode Hall L. J., vol. 50, no. 47, 2012
82   see the concept of ’regulated self-regulation’. C. estlund, rebuilding the law of the workplace in an era of 
self-regulation; Columbia Law Review vol 105. No. 2., march 2005. 
83   as for the discussion of the relationship between labour law and the market, see especially: s. Deakin  
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more transparent corporate image) and relational incentives (such as better, more trans-
parent relationship with stakeholders). all of these incentives are generated - normally 
and originally - by the market, but can be activated, steered and catalyzed by regulation as 
well. all in all, the function of regulation is to enhance these market-based incentives by 
boosting self-regulation (or sanctioning the lack of proper self-regulation). 
as an overall conclusion, the paper argues that such innovative regulatory methods as 
mandatory non-financial disclosure can add to a multi-coloured and vibrant regulatory 
arena for labour law, symbolizing that the law regulating labour cannot be fitted into a sin-
gle concept. These regulatory mechanisms - as complementary tools - might contribute to 
overcome the current limitations of traditional labour law mechanisms, however, they can 
never fully replace the traditional regulatory mechanisms of labour law.84 such regulatory 
strategies might help to fill the gap where traditional labour laws have remained largely 
ineffective. in general, these regulatory ideas may contribute to the re-vitalization and 
opening up of the horizon of labour regulation. 
84   one of the main critiques to be raised against such regulatory innovations is that the state intends to shift 
certain parts of law-enforcement to private actors. 
